File Name: princeton and representative democracy and oligarchy and .zip
Their conclusion was explosive: "Economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U. The paper soon went viral as proof that America is an "oligarchy" the press's term, not theirs where the views of the rich control what happens and the views of the middle class are ignored.
The authors were even on The Daily Show — not bad for academics without so much as a book to promote:. There's only one problem: Research published since then has raised serious questions about this paper, both its finding and its analysis. This is, of course, how normal science works; some academics put a finding out there, and their peers pick it apart.
But the study has become a frequently invoked piece of evidence in debates about money in politics, and the public and political debate has not kept up with the scholarly one.
And the latest scholarly critiques suggest that while the rich certainly have more political influence than the middle class, ordinary Americans still win a substantial share of the time, even when the affluent oppose them. Alexander Branham, University of Michigan professor Stuart Soroka, and UT professor Christopher Wlezien — have all taken a look at Gilens and Page's underlying data and found that their analysis doesn't hold up.
Gilens and Page used a database of 1, policy issues — which included data on the opinions of median-income Americans, the rich, business interests, and non-business interest groups like unions or the National Rifle Association — to determine whose opinions correlated most closely with actual government policy.
But the researchers critiquing the paper found that middle-income Americans and rich Americans actually agree on an overwhelming majority of topics. That means the groups agree on That leaves only bills on which the rich and the middle class disagree, and even there the disagreements are small.
On average, the groups' opinion gaps on the bills is The difference between the two is not statistically significant. And there are some funny examples in the list of middle-class victories. For instance, the middle class got what they wanted on public financing of elections: in all three s surveys included in the Gilens data, they opposed it, while the rich favor it.
That matches up with more recent research showing that wealthy people are more supportive of public election funding. So it's hard to say definitively, based on this data, that the rich are getting what they want more than the middle class.
And it's hard to claim, as Gilens and Page do, that "ordinary citizens get what they want from government only when they happen to agree with elites or interest groups that are really calling the shots. Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien also look at which specific issues spur disagreement: Do they fall down on ideological lines? Sort of, but not dramatically so. The authors find that the middle class got 26 liberal policy wins either a bill they supported passing or one they opposed getting blocked , 20 conservative wins, and 29 ideologically neutral wins.
The rich got 28 liberal wins, 26 conservative wins, and 37 neutral wins. The rich's wins are slightly more conservative on average, but not hugely so. Okay, but maybe those conservative wins for the rich were all on issues that mattered most to the rich. Maybe the middle class wins occasionally on social issues, but the rich succeed in preventing redistribution and other economic policies they don't like. Again, not really. There's a difference, but not a robust one.
They also looked at the views of the poor — those at the 10th percentile of the income scale. Here, too, there's lots of agreement. The poor, middle class, and rich agree on But here they find more evidence for differences in income-based representation. Bills supported just by the rich but not the poor or middle class passed But policies supported by the poor and no one else passed a mere Bashir's paper prods at the Gilens data even more and finds a number of holes.
Bashir concludes that strong support from the middle class is about as good a predictor of a policy being adopted as strong support from the rich. Bashir also notes that the Gilens and Page model explains very little. Its R-squared value is a measly 0. That is, 7. So even if the rich control the bulk of that and Bashir argues they do not , the absolute amount of sway over policy that represents is quite limited indeed. Peter Enns's paper takes another approach to analyzing cases of rich versus middle-class disagreement.
He notes that it's not just that the rich and middle class agree a lot; their levels of support for various policies also move in tandem. If policy A is more popular among the rich than policy B, then it's probably more popular than policy B among the middle class as well. This means the policies you'd most expect to pass, based on rich people's opinions, are also the policies you'd most expect to pass based on middle-class people's opinions.
So the actual policy outcomes you'd predict based on a model where only the rich matter aren't very different from the ones you'd predict based on a model where only the middle class matters. Gilens made four main points. First, the definition of "rich" here is "at the 90th percentile of the income distribution.
They're rich, for sure, but not super rich. It's impractical to use surveys to measure the opinions of the ultra rich millionaires, billionaires , but Gilens argues that their opinions would diverge from the middle class more dramatically. Second, he insists that the issues where the rich win despite middle-class opposition are important ones relating to redistribution and economic policy. But Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien found that win rates for the rich weren't significantly different between economic and social issues.
Third, he writes that even though the middle class and rich agree on most things, "a political system that responds to the preferences of average citizens is profoundly different from one in which average citizens get their way only when they happen to agree with the preferences of the well to-do. When they disagree, they win about half the time anyway.
Finally, Gilens argues that the use of "win rates" by Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien is misleading. By focusing on whether majorities of each group support a policy, they ignore gradations in the level of support. He also takes issue with them lumping in wins that consisted of a policy not passing — pretty common in a system with strong status quo bias, like American politics — with ones that consisted of a policy passing, a much rarer event:.
When the rich but not the middle-class favor a policy, the policy is adopted 37 percent of the time; when the middle-class but not the rich favor a policy, the policy is adopted 26 percent of the time.
Conversely, when the rich but not the middle-class oppose a policy, the policy fails 74 percent of the time and when the middle-class but not the rich oppose a policy, the policy fails 63 percent of the time. In other words, the tiny gap in win rates gets somewhat wider when you break it down a little.
Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien say this criticism misses the point. The middle class still gets its preferred policies enacted 26 percent of the time even when the rich are opposed. The picture Gilens and Page painted of a world where the opinions of the middle class literally count for nothing doesn't hold up.
This might seem intuitive. In a democracy, if 80 percent of people want universal health care, shouldn't there be universal health care? But this contention relies on a rather literal, and implausible, definition of democracy. As Vox's Matt Yglesias once put it, "The idea that the point of democracy is to implement legislative outcomes that are supported by broad-based surveys seems almost like a straw man dreamed up by an eighteenth-century monarchist.
Think about it. Most Americans aren't very politically engaged — and most don't want to be politically engaged , preferring that professional policymakers make decisions for them, so long as the economy stays on track. What are the odds that they've formed stable, durable opinions on dozens of highly specific policy issues? These are all fairly technical points that require a decent amount of background knowledge to understand, let alone develop a coherent opinion about. I write about economic policy for a living and you'd have to give me a couple of days before I had a real, informed opinion about investment tax credits.
What are the odds that people whose jobs don't mandate they follow policy debates would have that kind of background knowledge? This is known in public opinion research as the problem of "non-attitudes," and while Gilens and Page do what they can to address it, it's hard to eliminate entirely.
And if you look at the times in history when government was most responsive to public opinion, it doesn't appear that responsiveness is super well-correlated with good governance.
For example, Affluence and Influence finds that the nadir of representativeness was the mids, when Medicare, the war on poverty, and the Voting Rights Act were enacted; and the peak was George W. Bush's first term. Does that mean LBJ's administration was a democratic failure and Bush's was a democratic success? Or does it just suggest that the Bush administration was effective at getting highly persuadable voters to back big tax cuts and the Iraq War, rather than reflecting their wishes?
It's for reasons like this that most political theorists don't use pure representation as their test of whether a democracy is functioning well. Political theorist Andrew Sabl writes that while empirical political scientists like Gilens "assume that the normative standard for a well-functioning democracy is whether policy outcomes track public preferences," political theorists argue that the standard should be "something — as it might seem, almost anything — else.
There are "deliberative democrats," who think democracies should strive to enact the policies the people would support after calm, careful deliberation; there are small-r republicans, who measure democracies' success by the civic virtue of their residents; but you won't find basically any support for the idea that democracies should enact the people's opinions exactly as currently stated. It's entirely possible, of course, to think the political theorists are wrong and that responsiveness really is the most important thing.
These are matters of values, not of empirical truth or falsity. But strict responsiveness is not obviously the most important feature of a democracy. Our mission has never been more vital than it is in this moment: to empower through understanding. Financial contributions from our readers are a critical part of supporting our resource-intensive work and help us keep our journalism free for all.
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Those few ruling members have enough power to create policies that benefit them to the exclusion of the rest of society. They maintain their power through their relationships with each other. A plutocracy is a subset of an oligarchy. In a plutocracy, the leaders are rich. The leaders in an oligarchy don't have to be rich, even though they usually are. For example, a high school ruled by a popular clique is an oligarchy. A plutocracy is always an oligarchy, but there could be some oligarchies that aren't plutocracies.
Study: US is an oligarchy, not a democracy So concludes a recent study by Princeton University Prof Martin Gilens and beginning of talks inside the country between representatives of the east and the central authorities.
How a new model of democracy that opens up power to ordinary citizens could strengthen inclusiveness, responsiveness, and accountability in modern societies. To the ancient Greeks, democracy meant gathering in public and debating laws set by a randomly selected assembly of several hundred citizens. To the Icelandic Vikings, democracy meant meeting every summer in a field to discuss issues until consensus was reached.
A bold new approach to combatting the inherent corruption of representative democracy This provocative book reveals how the majority of modern liberal democracies have become increasingly oligarchic, suffering from a form of structural political decay first conceptualized by ancient philosophers. Systemic Corruption argues that the problem cannot be blamed on the actions of corrupt politicians but is built into the very fabric of our representative systems. Camila Vergara provides a compelling and original genealogy of political corruption from ancient to modern thought, and shows how representative democracy was designed to protect the interests of the already rich and powerful to the detriment of the majority. Unable to contain the unrelenting force of oligarchy, especially after experimenting with neoliberal policies, most democracies have been corrupted into oligarchic democracies. Vergara explains how to reverse this corrupting trajectory by establishing a new counterpower strong enough to control the ruling elites.
The iron law of oligarchy is a political theory first developed by the German sociologist Robert Michels in his book, Political Parties. Michels's theory states that all complex organizations, regardless of how democratic they are when started, eventually develop into oligarchies. Michels observed that since no sufficiently large and complex organization can function purely as a direct democracy , power within an organization will always get delegated to individuals within that group, elected or otherwise. Using anecdotes from political parties and trade unions struggling to operate democratically to build his argument in , Michels addressed the application of this law to representative democracy , and stated: "Who says organization, says oligarchy.
The first known use of the term in English dates from The term plutocracy is generally used as a pejorative to describe or warn against an undesirable condition. According to Noam Chomsky and Jimmy Carter , the modern United States resembles a plutocracy though with democratic forms.
chy, oligarchy, aristocracy, representative legislatures, or other forms of government, we should focus not just on the obvious things, like how well different forms.
Princeton University Press | Our contemporary representative democracies are very different. Modern parliaments are gated and.Exinabel 27.05.2021 at 12:54
From the Dept.Louise W. 28.05.2021 at 15:18
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